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In recent years and accelerated by the economic and financial crisis, complex global issues 
have moved to the forefront of policy making. These grand challenges require policy makers to 
address a variety of interrelated issues, which are built upon yet uncoordinated and dispersed 
bodies of knowledge. Due to the social dynamics of innovation, new socio-technical subsystems 
are emerging, however there is lack of exploitation of innovative solutions. In this paper we 
argue that issues of how knowledge is represented can have a part in this lack of exploitation. 
For example, when drivers of change are not only multiple but also mutable, it is not sensible to 
extrapolate the future from data and relationships of the past. This paper investigates ways in 
which futures thinking can be used as a tool for inspiring actions and structures that address the 
grand challenges. By analysing several scenario cases, elements of good practice and 
principles on how to strengthen innovation systems through future scenarios are identified. This 
is needed because innovation itself needs to be oriented along more sustainable pathways 
enabling transformations of socio-technical systems. 
Highlights 
- Grand challenges bringing the social dimension of innovation in the picture 
- Investigating the role for futures thinking and scenarios to inspire innovation 
- Future scenarios as a tool for orienting innovation systems 
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1. Introduction 
In the context of this paper, future scenarios can be seen as narratives set in the future to 
explore how the society would change if certain trends were to strengthen or diminish, or various 
events were to occur. Future scenarios substantially differ from predictions, i.e., extrapolations or 
trends, substituting the criterion of plausibility for probability (Harries, 2003). Scenarios are not 
equivalent to images of the future, but they consist of images of the future. Images of the future 
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are snapshots of future states, whereas scenarios consist of a logical sequence of images of the 
future (Greeuw et al., 2000).  
1.1 Developing and using future scenarios 
Scenario analysis is practiced across many domains and is not restricted to specialised futurists 
or scenario specialists. Developing and using scenarios can contribute at various levels of 
society by generating appropriate inputs for planning and decision-making and by facilitating 
dialogues between various stakeholders (Becker, 1983). The value of the scenario exercise 
depends on the ways in which the resulting insights are implemented in on-going and 
forthcoming actions. However, the explicit and direct uses of scenarios in predefined decision-
making contexts are just part of a broader social process (Da Costa et al., 2008). Also important 
indirect and diffuse links exist between developing and using scenarios and orienting innovation 
systems and research priorities (inspired by Andersen et al., 2007, p.8-9): 
− developing and using future scenarios may contribute to society’s strategic intelligence 
by stimulating future oriented thinking and by widening the perspectives and knowledge 
base of researchers, policy-makers and business decision-makers 
− developing and using future scenarios can be useful in creating a common language and 
understanding between the various interest groups  
− developing and using future scenarios can create and support a systemised negotiation 
process among key stakeholders (social actors)  
− developing and using future scenarios can be helpful in engaging decision-makers in 
specific issues, legitimating a chosen course of action, and supporting fruitful debates 
among stakeholders 
Although the use of scenarios has gained much adherence, its subjective and heuristic nature 
leaves many academics and decision-makers uncomfortable (Chermack, 2005). How do we 
know whether we have credible and salient scenarios? And how does developing and using 
scenarios lead to the expected direct and indirect inputs for orienting innovation systems? These 
concerns are legitimate and the use of scenarios would gain in academic standing if more 
research were conducted on their comparative performance and underlying theoretical premises 
(Chermack, 2005). Whilst the scenario literature makes explicit the methodological differences 
and similarities of various approaches, it tends to pay little attention to the underlying 
epistemological assumptions (Wilkinson & Eidinow, 2008). For example, scenarios that 
imaginatively represent plausible futures will meet resistance if they are used as predictions. 
 
1.2 Grand challenges 
The aim of this paper is to initiate a discussion on how scenario analysis can help to better cope 
with the grand challenges and to disclose some principles by which scenario processes can 
inspire innovation. Today’s grand challenges – from climate change to unemployment and 
poverty - go beyond economic and social policies (Boden et al., 2010). The recent economic 
crisis reminds us of the importance of mobilising science, technology and innovation not solely 
for generating economic benefits, but also for anticipating and responding to the grand 
challenges (OECD, 2011). At a strategic level, the European Union took up this challenge via 
the Innovation Union Flagship Initiative as part of the Europe 2020 strategy launched in 2010. 
This initiative is a strategic approach integrating research and innovation instruments and actors 
to tackle the “innovation emergency” Europe is facing (EC, 2011a, p1). 
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From a scientific perspective, it is accepted that the future is an essential element of strategy. 
For example, Hamel and Prahalad (1994) emphasise that strategy should draw up consistent 
visions of the future. In addition, several scholars state that scenarios constitute a major tool for 
considering the future in strategic planning (Porter, 1985, Godet, 1990, Wilson, 2000, Lindgren & 
Bandhold, 2003, Bradfield et al., 2005, Ringland, 2010). 
Grand challenges are usually interrelated and operating at a global scale (Cagnin et al., 2011). 
Often it is not clear what the real causes are and different policy options are competing, causing 
shifts in problem perception and priority setting. One result of the above described complexity is 
a type of uncertainty about the future, an uncertainty whose distinctive feature is disagreement 
amongst experts and stakeholders about the long-term consequences of present-day 
innovations (Webster, 1999). In addition, uncertainty increases as policy targets move 
progressively further from the present and it is uncomfortable: fear of the unknown generates 
resistance to change (Linstone, 1973). But also efforts to control, manage, and engineer the 
future produce increased uncertainties (Adam, 2006). For instance, developments in science 
and technology have a strong potential to influence social change. There are, however, many 
reasons why the practical use of scientific knowledge and technology varies widely between 
countries. Societies differ, economies differ, and governments deal with international scientific 
developments in different ways through the policies they pursue (Timmermans, 2001). This 
analysis indicates that policy and systems of innovation are shaped by social, cultural and 
political power as well as by technological rationalism and such indeterminism makes systemic 
approaches to innovation policy far from linear or predictable.  
The traditional concepts and models of innovation are not always adequate to embrace the 
complexity for addressing the grand challenges (Cagnin et al., 2011; OECD 2011). Grand 
challenges require that policy makers address a variety of interrelated issues, which are built 
upon as yet uncoordinated and dispersed bodies of knowledge. The modes of knowledge 
production have already experienced considerable changes. It has been well documented that 
the innovation process is regarded as interactive including a multitude of short-term and long-
term feedback loops between the different stages of the innovation process (Carlsson et al., 
2002; OECD, 2011). Looking at the grand challenges, innovations are not only contributing to 
the solutions. Innovations in the past have been also part of the current unsustainable trends. 
Therefore innovation research needs increasingly be oriented towards the challenges presented 
by environmental complexity and socio-economic turbulence (Rickards, 2003). 
In order to investigate how scenario analysis can help to better cope with the grand challenges 
and inspire innovation, we analyse several scenario exercises to better understand the role 
future scenarios can play as a tool for orienting innovation systems. The remaining sections of 
this paper are organised as follows: Section 2 sets out the methodology of how we used 
reflexive inquiry to analyse the scenario case studies. Section 3 describes how we conceptualise 
inspiring issues and paradigms from different scientific disciplines such as business and 
innovation research, futures studies, sociology and policy analysis. These concepts and 
paradigms are then used to analyse the selected scenario case studies. For example, we looked 
how the applied or perceived modes of thinking about the future and multiple stakeholder values 
are initiating enablers or barriers for the scenario process. In this paper we argue that this kind of 
reflexive inquiry can and does provide a sound basis for challenging current practice, for 
learning from experience and for better articulating our underlying theoretical premises. The 
outcomes of this inquiry are presented in Section 4 including also implications for practitioners 
by elaborating elements of good practice and areas of improvement. In Section 5, we further 
discuss our findings addressing how scenario practice can orientate innovation systems in the 
view of the grand challenges. Finally, in Section 6 we summarise our findings and conclude with 
some points of departure for further research. 
  




2. Material and methods 
How can we learn about orienting innovation systems from future scenario practice? We use the 
word “practice” to describe the implementation or execution of a concept, plan, methodology or 
theory. Most practice is based on a set of theories or assumptions. Sometimes those theories 
are explicit, most often they are implicit. The connection between practice and theory (unlike that 
between theory and practice) has traditionally been ignored, to the detriment of both (Gunderson 
et al., 2007). Reflexive inquiry draws on a social constructionist view of the world and provides a 
powerful approach that offers insights for academics and practitioners into how we constitute 
knowledge and realities in our thinking and research practice (Cunliffe, 2003). Reflexivity as a 
methodology (Alvesson & Sköldberg, 2000), questions representation by suggesting that we are 
constantly constructing meaning and social realities as we interact with others and talk about our 
experience. We therefore cannot ignore the situated nature of that experience and the cultural, 
historical, and linguistic traditions that permeate our work (Cunliffe, 2003). This means that 
practice, such as scenario practice, is rooted in a particular moment and place. 
In accordance with Cunliff (2003) and to be consistent with reflexive inquiry, we first have to 
deconstruct scenario practice. In order to do so, three complementary questions on policy 
change (after De Smedt, 2006) are applied to analyse the case studies:  
(i) How can developing and using future scenarios present a window of opportunity to 
effectively drive decisions? 
(ii) How can developing and using future scenarios enhance the legitimacy for action? 
(iii) How can developing and using future scenarios provide evidence to decision-makers 
empowering the stakeholders involved?  
The three questions represent a specific perspective linking action and decision-making with 
issues of (i) emergence, i.e. window of opportunity; (ii) legitimacy, i.e. truth claims; and (iii) 
empowering, i.e. stakeholder values (De Smedt, 2006). This questioning takes then the form of a 
‘turning back’ on knowledge, truth claims, language, and representation to make them more 
transparent (Cunliffe, 2003, p985 after Lawson 1985).  
The empirical evidence is based on a sample of 17 scenario projects (see Appendix 1. for an 
overview of the cases). This paper reports on the reflexive inquiry that originates from several 
workshops with scientists and practitioners where the case studies have been articulated and 
analysed in their context as part of the Cost Action A22 network2. In doing so, the workshops 
allowed for a systematic ex-post evaluation of similarities and differences between the chosen 
scenario projects. In the context of this paper, we will argue that this process of reflexive inquiry 
will provide the basis for creating new insights and adapting our underlying theoretical premises. 
                                                 
2 The Cost Action A22 network was a four year programme (2004-2007) entitled “Foresight Methodologies - Exploring 
new ways to explore the future” and funded by the Individuals, Societies, Culture and Health technical committee of 
the European Cooperation in the field of Scientific and Technical Research (Cost). The programme was 
operationalised through a series of eight workshops, followed by an open scientific conference in July 2007. The main 
research questions were: What methodological issues are salient in relation to the identification of emerging trends 
and change?, How commensurable are different modes of modelling and other forms of dynamical representation? 
How can different communities of practice interact in an overall productive and interested way? 
  




3. Concepts of innovation, futures thinking and scenarios 
 
3.1 Innovation systems 
Innovation involves the application of new ideas – or the reapplication of old ideas in new ways – 
to develop better solutions to our needs (Coates, 2003). Innovation is invariably a cumulative, 
collaborative activity in which ideas are shared, tested, refined, developed and applied 
(Leadbeater, 2008). The concept of national innovation systems is rooted in evolutionary 
economic theorizing on socio-technical change. It was introduced and elaborated, among 
others, by Nelson & Winter (1977), Lundvall (1992) and Freeman (1995). The development of 
innovation theory over the past decades has involved a major reformulation, with innovation no 
longer seen primarily as a process of discovery, i.e. new scientific or technological principles, but 
rather as a non-linear process of learning (Mytelka & Smith, 2002). An innovation system is also 
not static but evolves with alterations in the content of technologies and products as well as in 
the relationships among various other innovation systems. Due to the socially dynamic 
characteristic of innovation (Sternberg et al., 2003), new socio-technical (sub)systems will 
emerge over time (Carlsson et al., 2002). By consequence, innovation systems are described as 
networks of actors and institutions that develop, diffuse and use innovations (Edquist, 2007). 
Hence, innovation leads to change only to the extent that agents are successful in taking 
advantage of the opportunities, i.e. agents need to develop capabilities (Carlsson and 
Stankiewicz, 1991). 
Innovation in the 21st century differs from the model embraced in the last century (i.e. profit-
oriented and nationally targeted) with a linear, technological and deterministic characteristic 
(OECD, 2011). Our understanding of the unpredictable inter-dependency of multiple forces 
means that more experimental approaches to creating new solutions are necessary. Thus it is 
through trial-and-errors and learning-by-doing experiments that new solutions can be found to 
grand challenges. Hence, the social dimension in innovation should be acknowledged as a 
legitimate research area and linkages with social systems of innovation and social innovation 
stakeholders should be strengthened so that innovation experiments include the inherent social 
dimension within the research community (OECD, 2011). 
Although the innovation process is now much more open and receptive to social influences, 
further progress calls for a greater involvement of stakeholders who can introduce the necessary 
capabilities and interests in research and innovation to address the grand challenges. For 
instance, Hekkert and colleagues (2007) highlight that stimulating knowledge flows (alone) is not 
sufficient to induce technological change and economic performance. There is a need for 
stakeholders to exploit this knowledge in order to create new business opportunities. This 
stresses the importance of stakeholders as sources of innovation, sometimes overseen in the, 
more macro-oriented, nationally or sector oriented innovation system approaches. The required 
characteristics of the new mode of public involvement are challenging: long-term forward-looking 
intervention, inter-ministerial, demand-side instruments combined and co-ordinated with supply-
side instruments, participative, and based on foresight (OECD, 2011).  
 
3.2 Futures thinking 
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Futures thinking is used for medium to long-term strategic analysis and planning. According to 
Jørgensen (in press, citing Dreborg, 2004), there are three modes of thinking about the future, 
each with their own methodologies – the predictive, the eventualities and the visionary mode of 
thinking (see Table 1 for a more elaborate description). 
 
Table 1: Modes of thinking about the future 
Mode of thinking about the future Type of futures in 
focus 
Characteristics 
The predictive mode of thinking Probable futures Working with indications of what 
will happen. Trying to find the 
most likely development 
The eventualities mode of thinking Possible futures Openness to several different 
developments 
The visionary mode of thinking Preferable futures Envisioning how society can be 
designed in a better way 
Source: adapted from Jørgensen (in press) 
 
As highlighted in Table 1, the different modes of thinking imply a focus on a different 
representation of the future. Representations of the future can be seen as metaphorical 
descriptions. Usually, these representations are mental images, but they can also be external 
representations, such as pictures or textual imagery (Beers et al., 2010).  
One of the often-overlooked elements in the innovation process that hinders smooth 
communication and interaction within emergent networks is time (Selin, 2006). Following the 
work of Barbara Adam (Adam, 2006), time has many meanings beyond ‘clock time’. Adam 
argues that the meaning of time is socially constructed and that such meaning is performative. 
Futurists are of course used dealing with short, medium and long-term perspectives, but it has 
been shown that differences in the construction of time play a significant role in the construction 
of meaning about the future (e.g. of nanotechnologies: Selin, 2006). The generic methodological 
requirement from this perspective is an explicit account of the construction of time within the 
context of the study at hand. For instance, time is considered to be historically and culturally 
specific. Different historical periods, different cultures, and different stages of the lifecycle all 
display different relationships to time. This means that situations are rooted in a particular 
moment and place and seen through the perspective of a certain set of lenses (Aaltonen, 2009). 
 
3.3 Scenario practice and related techniques 
Reflecting the uncertain threats of the cold war, the development of scenario practice as a 
methodology for planning and decision-making probably started more than half a century ago in 
the field of war game analysis. The Rand Corporation in the US became one centre for scenario 
thinking and Herman Kahn, who joined Rand, explored the application of systems analysis and 
game theory in order to encourage `thinking the unthinkable' (Wilkinson & Eidinow, 2008). 
Meanwhile in France, Gaston Berger was starting to use scenarios to explore the long-term 
political and social future. He founded the Centre d'Etudes Prospectives and his approach to 
scenarios was primarily normative, i.e. scenarios intended to provide a guiding vision of the 
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future for policy makers (Marchais-Roubelat & Roubelat, 2011). Scenario building and planning 
was further developed for management purposes, for example through the works of Pierre 
Wack, Peter Schwartz and many others (Wilkinson & Eidinow, 2008). Since then, scenario 
approaches have continued to evolve and their use seems to be increasing again (van Notten et 
al., 2003; Bradfield et al., 2005, Van Asselt, 2010). 
Developing and using scenarios is a professional practice to support significant decisions, and 
therefore it needs to be more assured of its claims to knowledge (methodology). For instance, 
forecasting and modelling methods have a focus on what is known and what is unknown. This 
can encompass `What is likely', in terms of probabilities for example, but it is still essentially 
working in terms of the same basic known-unknown dichotomy (Wilkinson & Eidinow, 2008). In 
contrast, explorative scenarios deal with different kinds of knowledge, ignorance and 
uncertainty, for example, socially constructed ignorance or `uncomfortable knowledge' (Rayner, 
2006). 
The identification of the motivation behind any scenario exercise appears to underpin the 
scenario typology described by Borjesön et al., (2006) which reviews many other typologies 
before suggesting an alternative comprising three categories and six types. The categories arise 
from the kinds of question that a scenario user might use about the future: What will happen? 
What can happen? How can a specific target be reached? Each of these questions can be seen 
to evoke the motivation of a particular approach to scenarios. For example, in this typology 
“What will happen?” scenarios lead to predictive scenarios, in effect, forecasts, which look at 
what will happen as the likely development occurs. By contrast, “What can happen?” scenarios 
are normative scenarios - concerned with achieving particular future objectives - which lead to 
preserving and transforming scenarios. Preserving scenarios are used when the target can be 
met within an existing structure, while Transforming scenarios feature a form of backcasting, 
asking what would need to be changed for the target futures to be achieved. 
Although most reviews of scenario techniques distinguish between quantitative and qualitative 
techniques, the boundaries between approaches have become increasingly blurred by 
techniques that make use of both kinds of methods and information (Wollenberg et al., 2000). 
Hence, our brief overview of scenario techniques in the next paragraphs of this section is not 
intended to provide a comprehensive classification or typology. Merely, its role is to describe the 
variety of current techniques that are relevant for this paper. 
The concept of the multiple-axes method is based on one of the approaches used by Pierre 
Wack (Schoemaker, 1995). It generates four contrasting scenarios relevant to a particular area 
of interest, which may be geographic or thematic, by placing a major factor influencing the future 
of the issue being investigated on each of axes, which cross to form four quadrants if two axes 
are used. The factors chosen for the axes should be high-impact, high-uncertainty, to ensure 
that the four spaces defined by their intersection are clearly differentiated. These spaces are 
then developed into scenario narratives, reflecting the influence of other events and trends in 
addition to those represented on the two axes.  
Back-casting, inspired by the early work of Lovins (1976), starts with defining a desirable future 
and then works backwards to identify policies and programs that will connect the future to the 
present. Back-casting scenarios explore the preconditions that could lead to this desirable 
future, including a palette of strategies to reach this situation (Rotmans et al., 2000). 
The concept of roadmapping has its roots in science and technology planning (Phaal et al., 
2001). A science or technology roadmap is like a highway roadmap that describes how one 
might proceed from a starting point to a final destination expressed as a vision. Like a highway 
roadmap shows the intersections between roads, a science or technology roadmap also shows 
the intersections between scientific steps or technologies (Gordon, 2003). A roadmap can take 
  
- 8 - 
various forms, but generally comprises a time-based chart together with a number of layers, 
which provides a means to link technology and other resources to future products, as well as to 
innovation objectives and milestones (Phaal et al., 2001).  
The delphi-method is developed as a systematic, interactive forecasting method which relies on 
a panel of experts. Delphi method is based on the assumption that group judgments are more 
valid than individual judgments. It is a method for structuring a group communication process so 
that the process is effective in allowing a group of individuals, as a whole, to deal with a complex 
problem. Key elements to accomplish this structured communication are: feedback of individual 
contributions of information and knowledge; an assessment of the group judgment or view; 
some level of opportunity for individuals to revise views; and some degree of anonymity for the 
individual responses (Linstone & Turoff, 2002). This technique is often used in national 
foresights to guide innovation and national research policies (Webler et al., 1991; Gavigan & 
Scapolo, 1999; Georghiou et al., 2008). 
All the above describe approaches to futures thinking during which scenarios are produced or 
used or both. For example Delphi studies use micro-scenarios, road-maps and back-casting use 
end-point states, while most of the other techniques described produce narratives or images of 
alternative future states. These types of approaches are typical of those used in the projects 
listed in Appendix 1 which were used for empirical analysis in this paper. 
 
 
4. Results and implications 
The value of scenarios lies in the robustness of the claims to knowledge arising. As this 
knowledge is (socially) constructed, an explicit reflexive account of the production of that 
knowledge is a methodological necessity, as it will reveal significant choices underlying the 
presented scenarios (Fuller & De Smedt, 2008). To structure our research, the scenario cases 
are evaluated using the three complementary questions on policy change mentioned in Section 
2 (material and methods). An overview of our findings is given in the corresponding paragraphs 
(4.1, 4.2 and 4.3). Each of the paragraphs includes a description of representation issues linked 
with the approach and methods used, input, process and main outcome. Most of the case 
studies include elements that can be attributed to more than one cluster. As mentioned, the 
clusters are not a typology nor a comprehensive classification of the case studies. To better 
illustrate our finding, we did include for each of the paragraphs examples of good practice out of 
the case studies. In addition, implications for practitioners are highlighted by elaborating 
elements of good practice and areas of improvement. 
 
4.1 Window of opportunity 
Leveraging the first perspective, i.e. window of opportunity, we looked at scenarios as a tool to 
support planning and decision-making. Our analysis indicates contrasting motivations between 
developing and using future scenarios in the case studies from Appendix 1. When the motivation 
is oriented towards developing scenarios, the focus tends to shift towards building consensus 
within the scenarios, missing the opportunity to explore the potential for innovation in conflicting 
views. Although legitimate for several reasons, for example building a common platform for 
dialogue, a focus on consensus can take up too much resources (Borch & Mérida, in press), with 
a risk of diluting a sense of urgency. In addition, our analysis indicates that scenarios with a 
strong focus on consensus during the development are often too vague and too broad for 
defining tangible innovation opportunities. By reshaping the scenarios to reach consensus, they 
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are often limited to accepted statements about the obvious. Some examples of national 
foresights based on Delphi are known to have experienced problems linked with a dominance of 
consensus, see for instance Göll (in press). 
This is in contrast with scenario exercises, where the motivation is oriented towards using the 
future scenarios for strategic discussions. The focus here is less on which scenarios are “right” 
but is more oriented to whether the scenarios delineate the range of possible futures 
appropriately (Geyer & Scapolo, 2004). As documented by van der Heijden (1996), the strategic 
discussion has its origin in uncertainty, both in the external environment and within the 
organisation. Using inspirational scenarios (in this context, one could label them as simple in 
form but representing extreme uncertainties) can contribute strongly to triggering feelings of 
surprise and discovery. Responding to this emotive and cognitive disruption requires participants 
(i.e. users) to think in ways that produce innovative and competitive solutions in a changing 
environment. The DP21 scenarios (see Appendix 1) are a good example. As an implication for 
practitioners, we recommend that careful design of scenario exercises is needed to achieve a 
balance between developing and using scenarios to strengthen the sense of urgency. 
 
4. 2 Legitimacy for action 
Looking at the second perspective, i.e. legitimacy for action, our analysis revealed three clusters 
in the case studies from Appendix 1. The following paragraphs will describe the main 
characteristics for each of the clusters (resp. 4.2.1 framing boundaries, 4.2.2 back-casting from 
targets and 4.2.3 back-casting from principles). 
4.2.1 Framing boundaries 
A first cluster is characterised by a focus on framing boundaries. The “Prelude Scenarios”3 are a 
good example (see Appendix 1). An important input for the scenario work in this cluster are the 
comprehensive descriptions of the external drivers for change highlighting the uncertainty of 
future developments. This uncertainty is reflected in a distinguished set of possible long-term 
future images that are often derived from a multi-axes framework of the most important but 
uncertain drivers of change. Scenarios generated using the axes’ process are explorative rather 
than normative; they tend to focus on the strategic level although additional layers of detail can 
subsequently be added. The value of the set of scenarios lays in the capacity to explore 
boundaries. This method is excellent for presenting a rich picture of multiple facets of a potential 
future: when an experienced scenario writer or film-maker is engaged at the final stage, the set 
of scenarios produced can be very persuasive, even to a non-specialist audience. Narratives are 
a natural, resonating way for people to communicate, and can be helpful in dealing with 
complexity, as pointed out by Weick (1995). These narratives can create shared meanings and 
by doing so they legitimate the future since imaginations are owned by the individuals relating 
them (Inayatullah, 1990). Creating awareness for the unforeseen is most often an important 
objective and desired outcome of this cluster of scenario exercises.  
A technique underpinning these types of scenarios is described by Weiner & Brown (2006) as 
the extremes that inform the middle. We found that adapting for change is often the general 
theme in the lessons-learned. Still, it is less obvious how these scenarios can be used for 
bridging today’s decisions with the future images. We found that crystallising concrete policy 
initiatives for innovation from long-term future images, i.e. beyond twenty years, can be difficult. 
Most often, the scenarios are used to highlight important societal assets under threat. This links 
                                                 
3 PRELUDE: PRospective Environmental analysis of Land Use Development in Europe, EEA (2006) 
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well with the concept of risk-society (Beck, 1995) and risk management. Our analysis suggests 
that this can be partly contributed to the selected process design for developing the scenarios. 
By having a strong focus on the external dimension, adapting for change is logically seen as the 
dominant response. In that sense the potential for innovation within the system is less 
acknowledged.  
When considered from the perspective of creating legitimacy for action we also suggest that the 
scenarios in this cluster could benefit from complementary techniques connecting the long-term 
future images to the present via stepping stones. Using roadmaps is an example of such a 
complementary technique for linking scenarios with internal innovation capabilities. This would 
help to address the imbalance between outward and inward reflection. Moreover, while 
participatory scenario-making provides visions for multiple futures, a roadmap only operates with 
one vision. Linking scenarios with technology roadmapping initiates an exploratory and creative 
phase to identify and understand uncertainties. Developing a set of scenarios acknowledges 
multiple rather than one future, equally plausible, whereas roadmapping provides a framework 
for condensing all information in one map and timeframe - revealing windows of opportunity - 
thus linking decision-making with future scenarios. The legitimising aspect of this is the creation 
of a common understanding of challenges and establishing a common vision amongst the 
innovation stakeholders as a boundary framework before moving into technology roadmapping 
(Ricard and Borch, 2011). 
4.2.2 Back-casting from targets 
A second cluster is characterised by a focus on back-casting from targets. “Getting into the Right 
Lane for 2050”4 and AG20205 are good examples here (see Appendix 1). In this cluster, 
changes in the external environment are part of the scenarios. But in contrast with the first 
cluster, change is less described by framing very different long-term future worlds. The focus of 
the scenarios in the second cluster is oriented rather towards a sequence of clear targets linked 
with short-term step-stones, i.e. 5-10 year. By breaking up the long-term in more tangible time 
periods it helps to understand the necessary steps for embracing change. By mapping time, we 
become clearer on where we have come from and where we are going. This ‘roadmap’ linking 
the necessary steps, contributes to the recognition that the long-term target is not only possible 
but also achievable. In addition, the interplay of the different contributions to achieve the targets 
becomes more visible. The foreseen outcome of long-term investments or policies, for example, 
can be visualised and confronted with a changing environment. Different from the above cluster, 
this one already leverages the combined use of roadmaps. We found that selecting areas for 
future opportunities are the general theme in the lessons-learned from this cluster. Often the 
focus is very much on elaborating areas of enhanced institutional collaboration, technological 
cooperation and converging technologies. Clearly innovation is an essential feature of the 
scenarios. The images of the future are focused on key internal developments and often 
technology driven or driven by changes in our way of living.  
Our analysis also suggests possible improvements for this cluster. Roadmaps directed towards 
a single target are likely to be inappropriate where policy intervention may direct technology 
towards a different trajectory altogether (Saritas & Aylen, 2010; Ricard and Borch, 2011). The 
innovation potential of the scenarios can be strengthened through broadening the system 
boundaries and enriching the future images. Flexibility, either avoidance of surprises or fast 
utilization of sudden opportunities, becomes one of the key issues. In order to avoid surprises 
                                                 
4 PBL & Stockholm Resilience Centre (2009) 
5 AG2020 Foresight analysis for world agricultural markets (2020) and Europe. DG RTD (2011) 
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the policy/strategy process should be able to open the scope of observation for periphery 
incidents and early, unstructured data that implicate potential discontinuities (Ilmola & Kuusi, 
2006). In addition, including perspectives from the different stakeholders can reveal new areas 
for innovation (Prell et al., 2007). 
 
 
4.2.3 Back-casting from principles 
A third cluster is characterised by a focus on back-casting from principles. A good example can 
be found with the scenario practice developed by the Natural Step6 (see for instance Givaudan, 
2011 in Appendix 1). The main focal points of the scenarios are sustainability concerns and 
criteria. The principles can be seen as indirect and implicit representations of the future. The 
future plays the role of the time needed to introduce the necessary changes to comply with the 
envisaged principles. Change is implicit part of the scenarios but the focus is less on delineating 
the range of possible futures. Interaction between the organisation and the environment is seen 
as the main driver. This is often reflected in the outcomes envisioning a preferable future and 
experiments towards that future.  
Also for the third cluster, we suggest some areas of improvement with regard to legitimising 
actions by adding a planning perspective via roadmaps or similar approaches. Comprehensive 
and well-designed roadmaps linking today’s experiments with future images can improve the 
impact of the scenarios. In addition the success of the roadmaps can be tested for different 
possible future images. This will provide essential information about the robustness of the 
innovation potential. 
The 3rd SCAR foresight exercise (EC, 2011b, see Appendix 1) also falls into this cluster with its 
focus on research priorities and innovation to meet necessary change and uncertainties in the 
agri-food sector facing resource constrains and environmental limits. In the project report, the 
impacts of the scenarios are implemented as research priorities, but the implementation could 
be improved with regards to knowledge dissemination e.g. education and the scientific societies 
involvement in policy discourse. 
 
4.3 Empowering stakeholders 
Developing and using future scenarios to inspire innovation does not only deal with the 
collection of data and models; it also involves the interaction of the stakeholders, their ideas, 
values and capacities for social change. Looking at the third perspective, i.e. empowering 
stakeholders. Our analysis of the case studies from Appendix 1 revealed two clusters: i.e. expert 
versus stakeholder driven. 
In the past decades, expert judgement was the main input for scenario development. 
Involvement of stakeholders was not intentionally looked for. The Delphi-technique for instance 
is a forecasting technique that uses estimates from mainly experts (Rowe & Wright, 2001). In 
reality, this might lead to limitations. Firstly, the expert (i.e. scientific) mind-set fosters 
expectations of regularity, simplicity and certainty in the phenomena and in our interventions 
(Funtowicz & Ravetz, 1993). But these can inhibit the understanding of the problems and of 
appropriate methods to their solution (van’t Klooster & van Asselt, 2011). Secondly, whilst 
                                                 
6 http://www.naturalstep.org/ 
  
- 12 - 
expertise has never been either as widespread or in such demand as today, public willingness to 
challenge that expertise has also never been as high. As a result, the boundary between experts 
and the wider public has become blurred whenever one speaks of users and producers of 
knowledge (Nowotny, 2003).  
Our analysis suggests that scenarios developed with broader stakeholder/expert participation 
will provide richer future images that go beyond the probable that is determined by the past and 
present (Prell et al., 2007, Jetter & Schweinfort, 2011). As opposed to past scenario practice, we 
believe there is often no clear cut difference between experts and stakeholders: experts 
sometimes have a stake in the problem or solution discussed and stakeholders equally have 
their expertise. It is a key challenge to benefit from this rich and complex audience. 
Also from this ‘empowerment’ perspective we suggest some areas of improvement. Stakeholder 
involvement, for instance, may be facilitated by conceptualising the future as open and 
dilemmatic, and recognizing ambivalence as legitimate (Höijer et al., 2006). Thus the scenario 
process can be seen as frame for dialogue, not to reach consensus but to recognize other 
parties’ point of view. Recognition then, is a heuristic that leads away from conflict into a broader 
understanding of the complexity of a disputed subject (Borch & Mérida, in press). Although 
consensus can identify common grounds in contested territory, it should not be the primary goal 
of scenario processes. Rather we suggest that developing and using scenarios should be 
viewed as a systemised negotiation process among key stakeholders (social actors), 
investigating and utilizing potential future societal changes and developments (see also De 
Smedt, 2007 and Borch & Mérida, ibid.). 
To synthesise this section on results and implications, we argue that our reflexive inquiry of the 
selected cases from Appendix 1 helped to disclose several representation issues in scenario 
practice. Using a policy perspective, different clusters of practice have been revealed. In the next 
section we will discuss our findings against the initial key question of how futures thinking and 




5. Discussion  
Due to the social dynamic characteristic of innovation, new socio-technical subsystems are 
emerging (Carlsson et al., 2002), however following a policy perspective, there is lack of 
exploitation of innovative solutions for orienting innovation in itself along more sustainable 
pathways (OECD, 2011). For instance, there is a wide acceptance that the disconnection 
between economic growth and well-being is increasing. At the same time innovation has 
become one of the main engines of growth. However, these two overarching trends have not yet 
been reconciled (OECD, 2011). In this paper we argue that issues of representation have played 
a part in this lack of exploitation. For example, when drivers of change are not only multiple but 
also mutable, it is not sensible to extrapolate the future from data and relationships of the past. 
Hence, it is important to recognise that representing scientific and technological diversity offers 
an important mean to help foster more effective forms of innovation and promote social learning 
(Stirling, 2007). This complexity challenges the capacity of innovation systems to acknowledge 
the social dimension of innovation and to learn from experience. 
In both science and policy, it is accepted that visions about the future is an essential element of 
a strategy (for instance EC, 2011a., Hamel & Prahalad, 1994). In addition, several scholars state 
that scenarios constitute a major tool for considering the future in strategic planning (Porter, 
1985, Bradfield et al., 2005, Ringland, 2010). The question that emerges is how we can learn 
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from using and developing future scenarios to assist in the orientation of innovation systems? 
Developing and using scenarios can be considered a field of applied research, i.e. where 
particular methods are applied to ‘solve’ particular puzzles. Particular choices and uses of 
techniques will be influenced by the context in which applications are made. Contextual features 
will include, amongst other things, the morphology or physiology of the domain, the purpose and 
theoretical premises of the study, the community of practice being informed and the values 
inherent in the process. In this sense, no single discipline or particular prescribed set of methods 
can be considered to be optimal. However, the commonality of scenario applications is the 
orientation to the future and that the knowledge produced is uncertain. Therefore, being a 
professional practice to support significant decisions, developing and using scenarios needs to 
be more assured of its claims to knowledge (Fuller & De Smedt, 2008). 
Following a reflexive inquiry methodology (Alvesson & Sköldberg, 2000; Cunliff, 2003; see 
section 2 material and methods) in the analysis of the scenario cases listed in Appendix 1, three 
complementary questions on policy change are applied to analyse scenario practice: (i) “How 
can developing and using future scenarios present a window of opportunity to effectively drive 
decisions?”; (ii) “How can developing and using future scenarios enhance the legitimacy for 
action?”; and (iii) “How can developing and using future scenarios provide evidence to decision-
makers empowering the stakeholders involved?”. By questioning representation from a policy 
perspective and deconstructing future scenario practice, we were able to (re)construct findings 
to the above questions: (i) if a sense of urgency was established or was lacking (window of 
opportunity), (ii) what was and was not represented (legitimacy for action) and (iii) who was and 
who was not involved (empowering stakeholders). An overview of our findings is presented in 
Table 2. This table links issues of representation with clusters of practice.  
Based on our findings of the analysis of scenario practice in the case studies of Appendix 1, 
Table 2 describes for each cluster of practice (see Section 4.1, 4.2 and 4.3) the most common 
used images of the future, an example of a characteristic technique and the dominant mode of 
futures thinking.  
 





Types of futures 
in focus 
Techniques Modes of futures 
thinking 
(policy perspective) (most characteristic) (most characteristic) (example) (most characteristic) 




























S&T Roadmaps Predictive 
Legitimacy for 
action  






The natural step Visionary 
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Expert driven Shaped by 
expertise and 
discovery 
Expert panels Technocratic 
Empowering 
stakeholders 










Table 2 is a synthesis of our results and implications of the previous section. Instead of framing 
practice based on theory, future scenario practice is deconstructed into seven clusters. In Table 
2 these seven clusters are further linked to the most characteristic theoretical premises, here 
expressed as modes of futures thinking. For example, looking at ‘window of opportunity’, we 
argue that a strong focus on developing scenarios and consensus increases a risk of diluting a 
sense of urgency. During the scenario exercise, consensus may not be appropriate to promote 
differences and to stimulate novel ideas. Based on this observation (see Section 4.1), two 
clusters of practice can be distinguished: one cluster with using scenarios as the most 
characteristic feature, and another with developing scenarios as the most characteristic. For the 
two clusters, the scenario cases have been analysed to disclose elements of theoretical 
premises. In the first cluster, we found that the scenarios are used for supporting strategic 
discussions about futures that are shaped by surprise and confrontation. Examples of supportive 
techniques are the use of an uncertainty matrix and the multi-axes method using factors of high-
uncertainty and high impact. Based on our reflexive inquiry used to analyse scenario exercises 
in their context, we can then attribute the most characteristic mode of thinking7.  
Table 3 provides a brief description for each of the 7 dominant modes of futures thinking. This 
table also includes for each of the modes of future thinking proposed effects on or contributions 
to the enablers and barriers for orientating innovation systems through future scenarios. 
 




Leading theme Types of 
futures in 
focus 
Enablers and barriers for orienting 
innovation systems 
Intuitive The aim is to think “the 
unthinkable” and to 
conceptualise future situations 




Allows strong imagination including 
alternative futures that are competing 




The aim is to agree on 
common accepted 
probabilities of change 
(rejecting extreme ideas) 
Shaped by 
convention 
Strong on acceptance and alignment, but 
often too vague, too broad to inspire 
innovation 
Eventuality The aim is to explore 
contrasting futures and to 
conceptualise future situations 
Shaped by 
possible futures 
Allows rigorously exploring boundaries 
and complexity. Often an imbalance 
between outward/inward reflection 
                                                 
7 The clusters are not (intended to be) a typology. In each of the cases elements and aspects of different clusters are 
present, therefore it is not possible to link clusters with cases. However, as described in the previous section, for each 
of the clusters an example(s) of good practice is included. 
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for the long-term where 
uncertainties are expressed 
differently  
limiting the recognition of its internal 
innovation capacity 
Predictive The aim is to be better 
contextualize what we know to 




Allows defining (a sequence of ) clear 
steps for innovation. 
Weak on surprise and external change 
Visionary The aim is to envision how 
society can be designed in a 




Allows creating authentic alternative 
visions to guide innovation. 
Weak on clear targets, surprise and 
external change 
Technocratic The aim is to demonstrate 







Allows minimising inconsistencies and 
defining areas for innovation 
Weak on complexity of socio-
technological systems  
Evolutionary 
 
The aim is to engage in 
sustainable pathways 
enabling transformations of 
innovation systems  
Shaped by 
interaction 
Allows a systemised negotiation process 
linking a variety of social actors and 
creating the conditions for innovation 
Risk of not reaching out to key 
(technological) actors 
 
Innovation is not only about invention, creation, or discovery, it is also about adaptation and 
emergence of new innovation systems (Coates, 2003). Principles on how to orient innovation 
systems through future scenarios will require conditions for collaboration. The solutions 
developed should not simply be based in an academic research unit, in the company research 
and development department, or in the policy think tank. They should be socially reflexive and 
negotiated by the key actors (Goodwin, 2011). However, it is also crucial to keep in mind the 
limitations of the scenario methodology (Godet, 2000). Clearly, scenarios do not point to simple 
short-cuts into a more sustainable future (Geyer & Scapolo, 2004). 
Firstly, our analysis of the case studies from Appendix 1, suggests that a variety of modes of 
futures thinking, as articulations of theoretical premises, can be distinguished in future scenario 
practice. Secondly, our analysis abstracted different dominant modes of futures thinking linked 
within different clusters. In reality, each scenario exercise is a mixture of different modes and 
practice is shaped by the image(s) of the future and the techniques applied. Combinations of 
techniques are possible and found in our case studies and in literature (see for instance Postma 
& Liebl, 2005 and Saritas & Aylen, 2010). However to strengthen the enablers for innovation, the 
link between practice and theory, represented via the modes of futures thinking should be 
acknowledged when designing and implementing future scenario exercises. As described in 
Section 4 (results and implications) cross-fertilisations between the techniques of the different 
clusters can enhance the innovation potential. However, no single recipe exists and our 
recommendations should be seen as ‘design principles’. Hence, the benefits from combining 
techniques for each of the clusters become also clear from a theoretical point of view when 
looking at combination possibilities of the modes of futures thinking in Table 3.  
To synthesise, we argue that future scenarios developed with a combination of well-designed 
modes of futures thinking will provide richer future images that go beyond the probable that is 
determined by the past and present. This enhanced support is needed, because as Hauschildt 
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(2003) clearly states: “the success of innovation is to a great extent dependent upon the 






In this paper we analysed and discussed the applicability of future scenarios as narratives to 
represent and discuss different perspectives on past, present and future developments. Our use 
of a reflexive methodological approach with three complementary questions on policy change 
supported the clustering of different approaches of developing and using future scenarios as a 
tool for orienting innovation systems. Our analyses of the scenario case studies from Appendix 1 
revealed elements of good practice and implications on how better to address innovation 
through future scenarios. For instance, different modes of futures thinking have been identified 
through the process of deconstruction. In this paper, we argue that these modes of futures 
thinking are shown to contribute in different ways to orientating innovation systems. Hence, by 
using a reflexive methodology we were able to create a powerful heuristic to challenge current 
scenario practice and to learn from experience. In addition, we also identified some points of 
departure for further refinement. 
Firstly, and summarising our recommendations for future scenario practice, we suggest that 
representation issues (i.e. what is, and what is not represented in the scenarios, who was and 
who was not involved, and whether a sense of urgency was established or was lacking) are an 
important feature in the design and application of future scenario practice. In this paper we 
argue that the limits of current practice are to a certain extent linked with representation issues. 
As acknowledged in the previous sections (see also Table 2 and 3), cross-fertilisation between 
scenario approaches and techniques, such as framing boundaries, roadmapping, and back-
casting from principles can strongly enhance practice by enhancing representation. We also 
want to acknowledge the limits of our analysis: i.e. using a policy perspective for doing an ex-
post analysis of future scenario practice. Innovation systems are complex and dynamic and 
scenario practice is applied more widely than our sample. Also, other analytical perspectives 
exist and may be equally valid (Cunliffe, 2003), see for instance Seidl & van Aaken (2009). 
Therefore, when using reflexivity in research or in scenario practice, it is also essential to make 
one's perspective clear so that the claims to knowledge can be constructively critiqued and 
improved.  
Secondly, we argue that the use of cooperative strategies, i.e. participatory scenario analysis, is 
required to produce a variety of possible, and not only probable or desired futures among the 
actors that develop, diffuse, and use innovations. Hence, we believe that developing and using 
scenarios should be viewed as a systemised negotiation process among key stakeholders 
(social actors), investigating and utilizing potential future societal changes and developments. 
This integrated approach, i.e. integrating different modes of futures thinking, is needed for 
orienting innovation along more sustainable pathways enabling transformations of socio-
technical systems. However, a variety of representation issues exist, and more experiments and 
research are needed. 
Thirdly, we want to emphasise that the social dimension in innovation systems should be 
acknowledged as a legitimate research area and linkages with social innovators and other social 
innovation stakeholders should be strengthened so that social innovation experiments inform the 
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research community. Innovation systems, described by Edquist (2007) as networks of actors 




The authors are grateful to the COST Action A22 network, IPTS and different past and present 
foresight network initiatives such as the European Foresight Platform and ForLearn for 
organising creative discussion platforms on foresight and scenario initiatives. The constructive 




M. Aaltonen, Multi-ontology, sense-making and the emergence of the future, Futures 41 (2009) 
279 283. 
B. Adam, Futures Transformed, 2006. Last accessed on 31/001/12 and available at 
http://www.cardiff.ac.uk./socsi/futures/wp_ba_futurestransformed231006.pdf  
M. Alvesson, K.Sköldberg, Reflexive methodology: New vistas for qualitative research towards a 
reflexive methodology, London: Sage, 2000. 
P.D. Andersen, M. Borup, K. Borch, J. Kaivo-oja, A. Eerola, T. Finnfjörnsson, E. Øverland, E.A 
Eriksson, T. Malmér, B.A. Mölleryd, Foresight in Nordic innovation systems, Oslo, Nordic 
Innovation Centre, 2007. 
U. Beck, Ecological Politics in an Age of Risk, Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995. 
H.S. Becker, Scenarios: A Tool of Growing Importance to Policy Analysts in Government and 
Industry, Technology Forecasting and Social Change 23 (1983) 95 120. 
P.J. Beers, A. Veldkamp, F. Hermans, D. van Apeldoorn, J.M. Vervoort, K. Kok, Future 
sustainability and images, Futures 42 (2010) 723 732. 
M. Boden, C.Cagnin, V. Carabias, K. Haegeman, T. Konnola, Facing the future: time for the EU 
to meet global challenges, Luxembourg, Publications Office of the European Union, EUR 
24364 EN, 2010. http://ftp.jrc.es/EURdoc/JRC55981.pdf 
K. Borch, F. Mérida, Dialogue in Foresight: Consensus and Negotiation, In: K. Borch, S.M. 
Dingli, M.S. Jorgensen (Eds.), Exploring the Future. The Role of Interaction in Foresight. 
Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, (in press). 
L. Borjesön, M. Hojer, K-H. Dreborg, T. Ekvall, G. Finnveden, Scenario types and techniques: 
towards a user's guide, Futures 38 (2006) 723 739. 
R. Bradfield, G. Wright, G. Burt, G.Cairns, K. Van Der Heijden, The origins and evolution of 
scenario techniques in long range business planning, Futures 37 (2005) 795 812. 
C. Cagnin, E. Amanatidou, M. Keenan, Orienting innovation systems towards grand challenges 
and the roles that FTA can play, Proceedings of the Fourth International Seville Conference 
on Future-Oriented Technology Analysis (FTA), FTA for structural and systemic 
transformations in response to grand societal challenges: integrating insights, transforming 
institutions and shaping innovation systems, Seville, 12-13 May, 2011. 
  
- 18 - 
B. Carlsson, R. Stankiewicz, On the nature, function, and composition of technological systems, 
Journal of Evolutionary Economics 1 (1991) 93 118. 
B. Carlsson, S. Jacobsson, M. Holmén, A. Rickne, Innovation systems: analytical and 
methodological issues, Research Policy 31 (2002) 233 245. 
T.J. Chermack, Studying Scenario Planning: Theory Research Suggestions, and Hypotheses, 
Technological Forecasting and Social Change 72 (2005) 59 73. 
J.F. Coates, Future innovations in science and technology, In: L.V. Shavinina (Ed.): The 
International Handbook on Innovation, London: Pergamon, 2003. ISBN: 978-0-08-044198-6 
A.L. Cunliffe, Reflexive inquiry in organizational research: questions and possibilities, Human 
Relations 56 (2003) 983 1003. 
O. Da Costa, P. Warnke, C. Cagnin, F. Scapolo, The impact of foresight on policy-making: 
Insights from the FORLEARN mutual learning process, Technology Analysis and Strategic 
Management, 20 (2008) 369 387. 
P. De Smedt, Interactions between foresight and decision-making, Proceedings of the Second 
International Seville Seminar on Future-Oriented Technology Analysis: Impact of FTA 
Approaches on Policy and Decision-Making, Seville, 28-29 September, 2006. 
P. De Smedt, Can Negotiating the future influence policy and social change? Paper presented at 
the Future seminar of the Centre for Technology, Innovation and Culture, University of Oslo, 
7th of June, 2007. 
K.H. Dreborg, Scenarios and Structural Uncertainty. Explorations in the Field of Sustainable 
Transport,. Doctoral Thesis, Stockholm: KTH Infrastructure, 2004. 
EC, 2011a, Innovation Union Competitiveness report 2011, (Executive Summary). European 
Commission, DG Research and Innovation Brussels. 
EC, 2011b, Sustainable food consumption and production in a resource-constrained world. 3rd 
Foresight Exercise. European Commission DG Research and Innovation, Directorate E Unit 
E.4, Brussels. 
C. Edguist (Ed.), System of Innovation: Technologies, Institutions and Organizations, London: 
Pinter publishers, 1997. 
C. Freeman, The national system of innovation in historical perspective, Cambridge Journal of 
Economics 19 (1995) 5 24. 
T. Fuller, P. De Smedt, D. Rothman, Advancing foresight methodology through networked 
conversation. Proceedings of the Second International Seville Seminar on Future-Oriented 
Technology Analysis: Impact of FTA Approaches on Policy and Decision-Making – Seville 
28-29 September, 2006. 
T. Fuller, P. De Smedt, From oracles to dialogue, Proceedings of the Third International Seville 
Seminar on Future-Oriented Technology Analysis: Impacts and implications for policy and 
decision-making – Seville 16-17 October, 2008. 
S. Funtowicz, J. Ravetz, Science for the Post-Normal Age, Futures, 25 (1993) 735 755. 
J.P. Gavigan, F. Scapolo, A comparison of national foresight exercises, Foresight 1 (1999) 495 
517. 
L. Georghiou, M. Keenan, J. Cassingena, I. Miles, R. Popper, The handbook of technology 
foresight: concepts and practice, Edward Elgar Publishing, 2008. 
  
- 19 - 
A. Geyer, F. Scapolo, European manufacturing in transition - The challenge of sustainable 
development: Four scenarios 2015-2020, Innovation: Management, Policy & Practice 6 
(2004) 331 343. 
M. Godet, Integration of Scenarios and Strategic Management: Using Relevant, Consistent, and 
Likely Scenario, Futures, 22 (1990) 730 739. 
M. Godet, The Art of Scenarios and Strategic Planning: Tools and Pitfalls, Technological 
Forecasting and Social Change, 65 (2000) 3 22. 
P. Goodwin, Spanning boundaries: social innovation in a complex world. In OECD (Ed.) 
Fostering innovation to address social challenges, Workshop proceedings, OECD, Paris, 
2011, p. 59 64. 
T.J. Gordon, S&T Roadmapping. In .J.C. Glenn, T.J. Gordon (Eds.), Futures Research 
Methodology. Version 2.0 AC/UNU Millennium Project, American Council for the United 
Nations University Washington D.C., US, 2003. 
S.C.H. Greeuw, M.B.A. van Asselt, J. Grosskurth, C.A.M.H. Storms, N. Rijkens-Klomp, D.S. 
Rothman, J. Rotmans, Cloudy Crystal balls. An assessment of recent European and global 
scenario studies and models, Experts’ corner report: Prospects and scenarios 4, European 
Environment Agency (EEA), Copenhagen, Denmark, 2000. 
L. Gunderson, C. Folke, M. A. Janssen, Reflective practice, Ecology and Society 12(2007): 40. 
[online] URL: http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol12/iss2/art40/ 
G. Hamel, C.K. Prahalad, Competing for the Future, Boston: Harvard Business School Press, 
1994. 
C. Harries, Correspondence to what? Coherence to what? What is good scenario-based 
decision making? Technological Forecasting and Social Change 70 (2003) 797 817. 
J. Hauschildt, Promoters and champions in innovations: Development of a research paradigm, In 
L. V. Shavinina (Ed.), The international handbook on innovation (pp. 804- 811). London, UK: 
Pergamon, 2003. 
M.P. Hekkert, R.A.A. Suurs, S.O. Negro, S. Kuhlmann, R.E.H.M. Smits, Functions of Innovation 
systems: A new approach for analysing technological change, Technological Forecasting 
and Social Change 74 (2007) 413 432. 
B. Höijer, R. Lidskog, Y. Uggla, Facing dilemmas: sense–making and decision–making in late 
modernity, Futures, 38 (2006) 350 366. 
L. Ilmola, O. Kuusi, Filters of weak signals hinder foresight: Monitoring weak signals efficiently in 
corporate decision-making, Futures 38 (2006) 908 924. 
S. Inayatullah, Deconstructing and reconstructing the future: predictive, cultural and critical 
epistemologies, Futures 22 (1990) 115 141. 
A. Jetter, W. Schweinfort , Building scenarios with fuzzy cognitive maps: an exploratory study of 
solar energy, (2011) Futures 43 (2011) 52 66. 
M.S. Jørgensen, Visions and visioning in foresight activities, In: K. Borch, S.M. Dingli, M.S. 
Jorgensen (Eds.), Exploring the Future. The Role of Interaction in Foresight, Cheltenham: 
Edward Elgar, (in press). 
H. Lawson, Reflexivity. The post-modern predicament. La Salle, IL: Open Court, 1985. 
C. Leadbeater, We-Think: The Power of Mass Creativity, Profile Books, London, 2008. 
  
- 20 - 
M. Lindgren and H. Bandhold Scenario planning: The link between future and strategy, Palgrave 
Macmillan, New York, 2003. 
H. Linstone, On Discounting the Future, Technological Forecasting and Social Change 4 (1973) 
335 338. 
H. Linstone, M. Turoff (Ed.), The Delphi Method, 2002. Last accessed 31/01/12 and available at 
http://www.is.njit.edu/pubs/delphibook  
A. Lovins, Soft energy paths: towards a durable peace san Francisco, Friends of the Earth 
International, 1977, 231p. 
B.A. Lundvall, (Ed.) National Systems of Innovation: Towards a Theory of Innovation and 
Interactive Learning, London, Pinter, 1992. 
A. Marchais-Roubelat, F. Roubelat , Futures beyond disruptions, Futures 43 (2011) 130 133. 
L.K. Mytelka, K. Smith, Policy learning and innovation theory: an interactive and co-evolving 
process, Research Policy 14 (2002) 1 13. 
R. Nelson, S. Winter, In search of a useful theory of Innovation, Research Policy 6 (1977) 36 76. 
H. Nowotny, Democratising expertise and socially robust knowledge, Science and Public Policy 
30 (2003) 151 156. 
OECD, Fostering innovation to address social challenges, Workshop proceedings, OECD, Paris, 
2011. 
R. Phaal, C. Farrukh, D. Probert, T-plan. The fast start to technology roadmapping. Planning 
your route to success, Centre for Technology Management, IfM University of Cambridge, 
2001. 
T.J.B.M. Postma, F. Liebl, How to improve scenario analysis as a strategic management tool, 
Technological Forecasting and Social Change 72 (2005) 161 173. 
M.E. Porter, Competitive Advantage, Free Press, New York, 1985. 
C, Prell, .K. Hubacek, M.S. Reed, C. Quinn, N. Jin, J. Holden, T.P. Burt, M. Kirby, J. Sendzimir, 
If you have a hammer everything looks like a nail: traditional versus participatory model 
building, Interdisciplinary Science Reviews 32 (2007) 1 20.  
L.M. Ricard, K. Borch, From Future Scenarios to Roadmapping: Guiding Exploratory Innovation 
and Strategy. The 4th International Seville Conference on Future-Oriented Technology 
Analysis (FTA): 12 & 13 May, 2011. 
T. Rickards, The future of innovation research, In: L.V. Shavinina (Ed.): The International 
Handbook on Innovation, London, Pergamon, 2003. ISBN: 978-0-08-044198-6 
G. Ringland The role of scenarios in strategic foresight, Technological Forecasting and Social 
Change77 (2010) 1493 1498 
J. Rotmans, M.B.A. van Asselt, C. Anastasi, S. Greeuw, J. Mellors, S. Peters, D. Rothman, N. 
Rijkens, Visions for a sustainable Europe, Futures 32 (2000) 809 831. 
G. Rowe, G. Wright, Expert Opinions in Forecasting. Role of the Delphi Technique, In: J.S. 
Armstrong (Ed.): Principles of Forecasting: A Handbook of Researchers and Practitioners, 
Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2001. 
O. Saritas, J. Aylen, Using scenarios for roadmapping: The case of clean production, 
Technological Forecasting & Social Change 77 (2010) 1061 1075. 
  
- 21 - 
P.J.H. Schoemaker, Scenario Planning: A Tool for Strategic Thinking, Sloan Management 
Review (1995) 25 40. 
D. Seidl, D. van Aaken, Anticipating critique and occasional reason: modes of reasoning in the 
face of a radically open future”, in: L. Costanzo, B. MacKay (Eds.), The handbook of 
research on strategy and foresight, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, pp. 48-65. 
C. Selin, Time Matters: Temporal Harmony and Dissonance in Nanotechnology Networks, Time 
and Society 15 (2006) 121 139.  
R. Sternberg, J. Pretz, J. Kaufman, Types of innovation, In L. V. Shavinina (Ed.), The 
international handbook on innovation (pp. 158-169), London, UK: Pergamon, 2003. 
A. Stirling, A general framework for analysing diversity in science, technology and society, 
Journal of the Royal Society Interface 4 (2007) 707 719. 
A. Timmermans, Arenas as Institutional Sites for Policymaking: Patterns and Effects in 
Comparative Perspective, Journal of Comparative Policy Analysis: Research and Practice 3 
(2001) 311 337. 
K. van der Heijden, Scenarios: The Art of Strategic Conversation, Wiley, Chichester, 1996. 
S.A. van’ t Klooster, M.B.A. van Asselt, Accommodating or compromising change? A story about 
ambitions and historic deterministic scenarios, Futures 43 (2011) 86 98. 
P.W.F. van Notten, J.Rotmans, M.B.A., van Asselt, D.S. Rothman, An updated scenario 
typology, Futures 35 (2003) 423 443. 
T. Webler, D. Levine, H. Rakel, D. Renn, A novel approach to reducing uncertainty the group 
Delphi, Technological Forecasting and Social Change 39 (1991) 253 263. 
A. Webster, Technologies in transition, policies in transition: foresight in the risk society, 
Technovation 19 (1999) 413 421. 
K. Weick, Sensemaking in Organizations, Sage, London, 1995. 
E. Weiner, A. Brown, Future Think: How to Think Clearly in a Time of Change. Pearson, Prentice 
Hall, New York, 2006. 
A. Wilkinson, E. Eidinow, Evolving practices in environmental scenarios: a new scenario 
typology. Environ. Res. Lett. 3 (2008). 
I. Wilson, From Scenario Thinking to Strategic Action. Technological Forecasting and Social 
Change 65 (2000) 23 29. 
E. Wollenberg, D. Edmunds, L. Buck, Using scenarios to make decisions about the future: 
anticipatory learning for the adaptive co-management of community forests, Landscape and 
Urban Planning 47 (2000) 65 77. 
 
  
- 22 - 
Appendix 1. Overview of the case studies 
1. AG2020 Foresight analysis for world agricultural markets (2020) and Europe. DG RTD (2011), 
www.ag2020.org 
2. K. Borch, (in press) The Danish Technology Foresight on Environmentally Friendly Agriculture. In 
Exploring the future The role of interaction in foresight. Borch et al., (Eds.) Edward Elgar Cheltenham, 
UK. 
3. DP21 (2003) Dierlijke Productie & Consumptie in de 21ste eeuw. Last accessed on 29/06/11 and 
available in Dutch at http://www.kbs-frb.be/uploadedFiles/KBS-
FRB/Files/NL/PUB_1338_DP21_Stakeholders.pdf 
4. Duwobo (2010) Transitiemanagement duurzaam wonen en bouwen. Last accessed on 29/06/11 and 
available in Dutch at http://www.duwobo.be/index.cfm 
5. EC (2008) New challenges for agricultural research: climate change, food security, rural development, 
agricultural knowledge systems. The 2nd SCAR Foresight Exercise. Last accessed on 29/06/11 and 
available at http://ec.europa.eu/research/agriculture/scar/pdf/scar_2nd_foresight_exercise_en.pdf 
6. EC (2011b) Sustainable food consumption and production in a resource-constrained world. 3rd 
Foresight Exercise. European Commission DG RTD, Directorate E Unit E.4, Brussel. 
7. EEA (2006) Prelude (PRospective Environmental analysis of Land Use Development in Europe) 
scenarios. Available at http://www.eea.europa.eu/multimedia/interactive/prelude-scenarios/prelude 
8. European Commission (2009) The world in 2025. Rising Asia and socio-ecological transition. 
Research*eu, Brussels. Last accessed on 29/06/11 and available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/research/social-sciences/pdf/the-world-in-2025-report_en.pdf 
9. Givaudan ( 2011) Sustainability, translating vision into action. Last accessed on 29/06/11 and 
available at www.givaudan.com 
10. E.Göll, (in press) Futur – the Research Dialogue in Germany. In Exploring the future The role of 
interaction in foresight. Borch et al (eds.) Edward Elgar Cheltenham, UK. 
11. L.A. Pace, (in press) Strategic Planning for the Future: Malta’s eFORESEE Experience. In Exploring 
the future The role of interaction in foresight. Borch et al., (eds.) Edward Elgar Cheltenham, UK. 
12. PBL & Stockholm Resilience Centre (2009) Getting into the Right Lane for 2050. Netherlands 
Environmental Assessment Agency (PBL), Bilthoven, NL. Last accessed on 29/06/11 and available at 
www.pbl.nl/en 
13. M.S. Jørgensen, (in press) Case Denmark Green Technology Foresight, Phase 1. In Exploring the 
future The role of interaction in foresight. Borch et al., (eds.) Edward Elgar Cheltenham, UK 
14. S.Stalpers, C. Kroeze (in press) Dialogues in the COOL Project. In Exploring the future The role of 
interaction in foresight. Borch et al., (eds.) Edward Elgar Cheltenham, UK. 
15. UNEP/RIVM (2003). Four scenarios for Europe. Based on UNEP’s third Global Environment Outlook. 
Last accessed on 29/06/11 and available at 
http://www.unep.org/geo/GEO3/pdfs/four_scenarios_europe.pdf 
16. VLM (2009) Buiten de lijnen. Vlaamse Land Maatschappij, Brussel. Last accessed on 29/06/11 and 
available in Dutch at 
http://www.vlm.be/SiteCollectionDocuments/Publicaties/Platteland/VLM_brochure_DEF.pdf 
17. WBCSD (2010) Vision 2050: The new agenda for business. World Business Council for Sustainable 






- 23 - 
Vitae 
Peter De Smedt has a background in ecological system analyses. His professional challenge is 
connecting science and policy. On a broad range of regional and EU projects, involving foresight and 
integrated assessment, Peter worked together with experts and stakeholders towards achieving a 
common understanding on non-sustainable trends, offering scenarios and integrated solutions to support 
policy-makers. Currently Peter works at the Research Centre of the Flemish Government where he is in 
charge of foresight and sustainability assessment. 
Kristian Borch has a background in biochemistry and conflict management. His field of interest is socio-
technological aspects such as uncertainty, ethics and sustainability, of emerging technologies mainly 
inside agriculture, food production, biotechnology and bioenergy. Furthermore, he is an expert in foresight 
and scenario methodologies, where his interests are focused on how to handle trans-disciplinary conflicts 
and scientific uncertainty. Currently Kristian is Head of Section in the Department of Management 
Engineering (DTU Man) at the Technical University of Denmark. 
Ted Fuller is a business academic and currently Director of Research for the Faculty of Business and 
Law at the University of Lincoln (UK). He is Professor of Entrepreneurship and Strategic Foresight. His 
academic mission is to understand how futures are created, to investigate society’s relationship with the 
future and to develop responsible people who can create futures. 
